"Stock price changes and investor behavior before and after the Crash represent no discontinuity with the general pattern of how markets have always worked."
"[Investors] fail to appreciate the workings of countervailing forces; change and momentum remain largely misunderstood concepts. Most investors have a natural inclination to cling to the course to which they are currently committed."
"Even if we pick a less ebullient year than 1936," Bernstein continues, "and figure it out to 1939 instead, the total return still works out to about 6% in nominal terms. These are hardly returns to sniff at, particularly when adjusted for the deflation that accompanies them."
"I believe an article by Benjamin Graham that I read many years ago carried the opinion that the development of liquid, high-volume auction markets for shares of publicly held American companies has been about the worst thing that has ever happened to the investment business. I have a great deal of sympathy with his observation."
"I have said often to almost anyone who would listen that...a portfolio of securities [should] be run like a real estate portfolio...The typical real estate commitment is made in anticipation of a projected cash flow versus expenses, i.e., the future internal rate of return...the investor does not assume that he will be able to sell the property at a higher price to someone else later on. Common stock portfolios should be constructed, and their future returns measured, by the same set of criteria."